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        Abstract 
Sri Lanka, in 1978, introduced outward looking export oriented 
industrialization (OL-EOI) policy with heavy reliance on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) against the three decade long inward looking 
import substitution industrialization (IL-ISI) policy that had caused 
serious impediments to economic development. Although four 
decades have passed since then, theoretically founded analyses to 
assess Sri Lanka’s locational soundness are scarce. Thus, this study 
adopts the Investment Development Path (IDP) framework of John 
Dunning and Rajnish Narula (1996) for assessing the strength of Sri 
Lanka as an international industrial location. This study primarily 
traces the investment development path of Sri Lanka for the past 
seven decades (1950-2015) covering two policy regimes, namely; 
relatively closed economic policy regime (1950-1977) and the open 
economic policy regime (1978-2015). The findings reveal that Sri 
Lanka has only been able to reach the early second stage of the IDP. 
This fact can be appropriated to insignificant FDI inflows in 
consequent to meager supply of location specific created assets (Lca) 
in contrast to heavy reliance on location specific natural assets (Lna).  
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1. Introduction 
The outward looking development policy has heavily replaced the self-reliant 
inward looking development policy and become a predominant development 
policy in the entire world. This development framework is essentially 
characterized by trade and investment liberalization with the underlying 
conviction that trade and direct investments are ‘engines of growth’ (United 
Nations, 1992). Direct investment primarily engages in manufacturing, exports 
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and later, through material imports and output exports, intra-firm-trade. It is these 
investment and trade effects that gradually transform economies from the state of 
underdevelopment to that of development (Dunning, 1996).  
Sri Lanka adopted FDI-reliant export oriented industrialization policy in 
1978 and chose to follow the development model of the Newly Industrialized 
countries (NICs) in East and Southeast Asia. This new policy continued for 
almost four decades to date since then withstanding political changes that took 
place in the latter half of that period. It is the general impression that Sri Lanka 
has only meagerly benefited from the FDI-reliant policy. This notion promotes 
the following general conclusions also: (a) FDI inflow is insignificant, (b) FDI is 
heavily concentrated in the garment industry (Atapattu, 1997), (c) local content of 
FDI-based industries is too low, (d) FDI-based industries are labor intensive, (e) 
FDI based industries have provided jobs mainly for unskilled and semi-skilled 
female workers and a very few graduates have been employed (Karunathilake, 
1987), (f) technology transfer is low (Perera, C and Dasanayake, S; 2004) and (g) 
Sri Lanka has failed while East Asia succeeded in FDI-reliant policy. It is obvious 
that these pessimistic conclusions relating to the FDI-reliant development have 
been derived without relying much on theoretical foundation and thus require 
theoretical explanations.  
On the contrary, Athukorala and Rajapathirana (2004) systematically 
surveyed the outcomes of investment liberalization in Sri Lanka and identified 
that the export oriented foreign direct investment had produced significant 
development effects.  They noted that “the ability of a country to capture the full 
benefits of trade and investment liberalization depends crucially on the existence 
of a favorable macroeconomic environment and political stability. In the Sri 
Lankan case, these pre-conditions were largely missing for much of the post-
reform period, except for two sub-periods between 1977-82 and 1990-94. Any 
analysis of the outcome of the significant trade and investment liberalization in 
Sri Lanka needs to be qualified for this lacuna in the overall investment climate” 
(Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2004:71).  
Further, providing numerical evidence on effects of capital formation, 
trade, economic growth, and employment they have challenged the notion that Sri 
Lanka has failed. This was followed by the debut of a unique observation on the 
FDI-reliant development in Sri Lanka by Athukorala (1997). He noted that “it is 
common place to draw upon the experience of the NICs as a standard in 
assessing Sri Lanka’s achievements. Such practice leads to confusion because the 
role of FDI in export expansion varies depending on the nature, timing, and 
topological characteristics of the host country such as the degree of 
industrialization and the stage of entrepreneurial development” (Athukorala, 
1997:387). In support of this argument, Kelegama (2006) pointed out that Sri 
Lanka could be pushed to the NIC status through attracting ‘large-scale FDI’ if 
Sri Lanka had attained macroeconomic stability, political stability, better 
infrastructure, technical skills, improved local entrepreneurship, and modern 
factories for multinational corporations. While these studies connote that Sri 
3 
 
Lanka has fared well in the FDI-reliant development policy despite the fact that 
certain crucial factors required for achieving FDI-reliant development are either 
weak or absent. 
While these studies have shed light into various perspectives of FDI-
reliant development and described the past experience logically, it is also obvious 
that they lack theoretical explanations to Sri Lanka’s strength as a location for 
international production system organized by multinational corporations through 
FDI. Different nations serve as internationally integrated production centers in the 
present production system organized by multinational corporations. The 
qualification to enter the system is explained through the ‘Location specific 
advantage’ (Dunning, 1982) of individual countries. The entry alone does not 
guarantee locational success and thus attention is required to its sustainability and 
sustainability depends on the strengths of location specific advantages. Strength 
of a location is determined by two factors; they are (1) location specific natural 
assets and (2) location specific created assets.  
 Therefore, measuring success or failure of FDI-reliant development 
strategy in terms of value of FDI, employment generated, foreign exchanged 
earned etc. is incomplete as all these are consequent to the degrees of strengths of 
location specific advantages that a country possesses. In this backdrop, we find a 
gap in the concurrent analytical approach and thus adopt the theoretical tool 
Investment Development Path devised by John Dunning (1982) to examine Sri 
Lanka’s strength as an industrial location in the global production system. The 
unique feature of this approach is that it introduces new and broad based method 
of analysis and measures country’s locational strength instead of consequences of 
FDI-reliant development strategy. The findings based on such analytical approach 
are widely valid and thus they can guide FDI-reliant development policy of the 
country. Particularly, the analysis relating to different political and policy 
regimes, as described below, will help recognize the role of the government in 
created asset augmentation.  
    
2. Theoretical Framework and Method 
Above arguments and conclusions can only be confirmed through theoretical 
evidence of the development experience of the FDI-reliant development strategy. 
A widely known theoretical framework for assessing FDI-reliant development can 
be traced to the Investment Development Path (IDP), originally proposed by John 
Dunning (1982) and sophisticated by Rajnish Narula (1996). Proven test results 
and properties (Dunning and Narula, 1996:31), the IDP proposition is adopted as 
the analytical tool for the purpose of this study. The IDP is characteristically a 
measure of overall development position of countries in connection to FDI. The 
distinctive feature of this tool is that it can, on the whole, measure the status and 
vitality of the FDI-reliant development systematically connecting net outward 
investment (NOI) and gross domestic product (GDP) in per capita terms.  
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Net outward investment is the difference between inward and outward 
direct investment. The NOI and GDP are normalized by dividing by the 
population of the country concerned and hence the per capita NOI and per capita 
GDP are derived. The investment development path hypothesis was elaborated by 
several subsequent studies (Narula, 1996; Dunning and Narula 1996) and now it 
proposes five distinctive stages of the investment and development. The IDP 
suggests that the stages of the development path are determined by the response 
of Multinational Corporations (MNC) to the types and extent of advantages 
provided to them by the host country. The MNC would engage in international 
operations through mobilizing their internalization (I) skills in order to benefit 
from their ownerships (O) in cross-border locations. For this, healthy location 
specific advantages (L) are imperative. On one hand, the locations that would not 
provide advantages will not be conducive for MNC and thus internalization will 
not take place at such locations1 . On the other hand, the higher the location 
advantage the more intensive will be the internalization in such locations.  
The operations of MNC in a particular country (location) are governed by 
two sets of assets. They are location-specific natural assets (L-na) and location-
specific created assets (L-ca). Nature, availability, and augmentation of these 
assets at a certain location determine the likelihood and the degree of it to become 
a host country for cross-border operations of MNC. Accumulation of these assets 
pushes countries from the host country status to investor country status along the 
transformation of the economy. This, in turn, determines the inflow and outflow 
patterns of direct investment to and from that country. It is, thus, obvious that 
these assets at a time absorb FDI while at other times emit FDI causing the 
phenomenon of FDI inflow and outflow cycle (Rajaratne, 1998). When FDI 
inflow exceeds outflow, a country will experience negative net outward 
investment (NOI) position. The reverse of this relationship will result in positive 
NOI position.  
 
Figure 1: Investment Development Path 
 
Source: Narula (1996:22)  
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Countries in stage-I opt for self-reliant development policy and refuse 
economic liberalization and FDI-reliant development policy. In consequence, 
these countries receive a negligible amount of FDI and exhibit zero or near-zero 
NOI position along with a low per capita income. Though these countries may 
possess natural asset related advantages, the paucity of created assets limit the use 
of the natural assets by MNC. The countries indicated in the Stage-II, pursue 
liberal and FDI friendly policies. In response, these countries begin to receive FDI 
and as a result their NOI position will deepen. In other words, these countries will 
continue to receive more FDI than what outflows from them resulting in a large 
negative net outflow of FDI. The degree of NOI in this stage is appropriated to 
the supply of location specific advantages which can be identified as natural and 
created assets that together push the NOI position further downward. 
Correspondingly, in these nations per capita GDP will grow.  
In the Stage-III, NOI starts to bottom out as these countries begin to invest 
outward significantly while still receive large sums of FDI. This phenomenon is 
caused by the depletion or scarcity of natural assets but augmentation of created 
assets. At this stage, the host country runs out of advantages in natural assets and 
finds itself disadvantageous as far as natural assets are concerned. Yet, the 
gradually augmented created assets now opportune for the firms (domestic and 
foreign) to engage in cross-border operations to benefit from the firm specific 
ownership assets. At this stage, industrial sophistication intensifies and as a result 
the per capita income improves. With extensive internalization drive of domestic 
MNCs (together with foreign MNCs), these countries eventually complete the 
FDI-in-out-cycle (Rajaratne, 1998) and move to a positive NOI position indicated 
in the Stage IV. At this stage industrial structure is sophisticated and high per 
capita income level is reached. Finally, at the Stage-V, backed by an advanced 
liberalization move also, countries tend to mutually rely on direct investment 
where cross border mergers and acquisitions become prominent. Created assets 
will almost completely determine the FDI flow amounts and patterns among the 
involving countries which have already gained economic development at this 
stage.   
Dunning and Narula (1996) identified technology homogeneity, market 
homogeneity, product and technology collaboration, joint research and 
development (J-R and D), mergers and acquisitions (M and A), alliance 
capitalism, and inter-firm stake ownership as the causes of this phenomenon. At 
this stage, knowledge intensive industrial structure with high economic 
development level is achieved (Rajaratne, 2006). With these properties, the IDP 
proposition can be identified as the most appropriate tool for examining the 
investment-development relationship. The IDP has been proven to be significant 
and an acceptable tool by the comprehensive tests carried out by Dunning (1982, 
1996) and Narula (1996) for a sample of 88 countries and separate samples for 
natural-asset-rich countries and created-asset-rich countries (Dunning and Narula, 
1996:31).  
 
6 
 
 
The IDP position of Sri Lanka is calculated for three different periods 
separately. Firstly, IDP position of Sri Lanka for the whole seven decades since 
1950 is calculated to determine the long run pattern of FDI-reliant development 
without considering differences of policy regimes. Secondly, IDP for the period 
between 1950 and 1977 is derived to explain the investment-development pattern 
of the country in a non-liberalized relatively closed market regime (basically). 
Thirdly, the IDP is derived for the liberalized regime between 1978 and 2015. 
Time series data published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka on per capita GDP at 
current factor cost prices and per capita NOI at current prices in Sri Lanka Rupees 
(see, Table 1), are used in the study.  
 
3. Data and Discussion 
Data are compiled and tested for five different periods in this study based on FDI 
related policy regimes and political regimes. The first period is marked as the 
inward-looking import substitution industrial (IL-ISI) policy which generally 
existed between 1950 and 1977. The second period begins in 1978 with outward 
looking exports-led industrialization (OL-EOI) and continues until the date of this 
research i.e. 2015. The third period spreads between 1978 and 1994 which 
signifies the political regime of the UNP government that propagated FDI-reliant 
development strategy with open market policy. The fourth period extends from 
1995 to 2015 which is SLFP regime that proposed a ‘human face to open 
economy’ with barriers to multinational corporations. The last period is the post 
war period that starts in 2010 with a new strong government. These demarcations 
are also meant for describing variations of location specific created assets 
between the periods  
Sri Lanka shifted from inward-looking import substitution industrial (IL-
ISI) policy to that of outward looking exports-led industrialization (OL-EOI) in 
the year 1978. Until that year since Independence, self-reliant development was 
followed. However, the prospective role of FDI in economic development had 
been recognized as early as 1949 in the first budget speech of independent Sri 
Lanka2. Subsequent policy formulation for FDI under IL-ISI policy appeared in 
the white paper on FDI in 1955, and the policy statements of 1966 and 1972 
(Vidanapathirana, 1986). The liberal stance for FDI that prevailed from 1948 
through 1955 was undermined by the Ten Year Development Plan in 1956 which 
propagated a strong self-reliant IL-ISI policy. And FDI hostile policy continued 
well until 1977 with some exceptions during 1965-70. Thus until 1977, Sri Lanka 
remained an unimportant FDI recipient country due to moratorium law3 and other 
unfavorable policies (Colombage and Karunaratne, 1986) and Hicken Looper law 
enforcement by the USA. As a result, Sri Lanka remained in the Stage-I of the 
Investment Development Path for a period of three decades with insignificant 
relationship between NOI and GDP at the slope of zero as depicted in the Figure 
2.  
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Figure 2: The IDP of Sri Lanka (1950-1977) 
 
Source: Appended Table 1 
 
The outward looking export-oriented industrialization (OL-EOI) policy 
itself has been a favorable and prominent created asset of the country in receiving 
inward FDI since 1978. From this year onward, Sri Lanka has continued to 
receive larger sums of FDI compared to the previous policy regime. As a result of 
this fundamental change in the created asset structure, Sri Lanka managed to 
immediately enter the Stage-II of the IDP as the NOI position began to deepen 
gradually. Sri Lanka’s per capita NOI jumped to SLR -51 in 1979 from mere -
1.70 in 1978 and it has reached SLR -5,223 today (see Table I). In dollar terms, 
during the last four decades Sri Lanka’s NOI has increased by mere US$-1 per 
year to reach US$-38 in 2015. These statistics reveal that Sri Lanka’s IDP has 
been generally flat throughout the whole period except for the very first few years 
since 1978 where the slope of IDP was high. Figure-3 illustrates that Sri Lanka 
has taken ten years to reach NOI level of SLR-5000 from SLR-2000 level. This 
has caused long run low NOI-GDP relationship at the slope of -0.011. Though 
this slope is a highly significant slope compared to close market regime that 
existed prior to 1978 the increase of Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP during the past 
several years cannot be explained by IDP. The rapid increase of GDP during the 
past several years must be due to increase in other sources of income such as 
foreign loans and remittances.  
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Figure 3: The IDP of Sri Lanka (1978-2015) 
 
Source: Appended Table 1 
 
 
The question that Sri Lanka is a poor FDI recipient country has generally 
been raised as a major problem of the FDI-reliant development policy of Sri 
Lanka (Lakshman, 1997). Figure 2 confirms that before 1977 Sri Lanka’s IDP 
remained in the stage-I and Figure-3 depicts that it has entered stage-II. However, 
it did not rapidly improve during the past four decades due to insignificant annual 
receipts of FDI. This drawback is due to Sri Lanka’s inability to sufficiently 
bestow location specific advantages to the MNC. This drawback primarily 
involves diminishing advantage of natural assets. Price hike and poor supply of 
natural resources, wage rate hikes, problems in labor supply, and low labor 
productivity have caused to diminish the advantage of natural assets. Secondly, 
Sri Lanka’s created assets such as markets, labor skills, supply and cost of capital, 
industrial structure, support industries, infrastructure and its quality, logistics, 
industrial peace, economic policy, macroeconomic management, and politics and 
governance have not competitively enhanced Sri Lanka’s created assets position. 
Thirdly, some of the created assets of Sri Lanka were paradoxical to her 
investment and business climate. They include the political climate and industrial 
relations. Fourthly, the closure of the sectors such as retail business, distribution, 
transport and insurance, etc., for FDI has undoubtedly led to location specific 
disadvantage. The progress in IDP can be achieved through both endowment of 
natural asset and the competitiveness in the created assets.  
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Sri Lanka’s IDP has been disturbed several times and has caused 
deterioration in the created assets of political nature. First, the widespread 
communal violence erupted in 1983 caused a serious drawback in the flow of FDI 
as the investors found Sri Lanka an unsafe location. Big investors such as 
Motorola of the USA discontinued projects due to the outbreak of communal 
violence (Vidanapathirana, 1986). He further observed that the project approval to 
project contract ratio during this period was 2:1 while capital involvement was 
7:4. The second downturn in FDI inflow occurred during 1988 to 1989 period due 
to widespread antagonism of the patriotic movement. In consequence, per capita 
NOI dropped from SLR-105.15 in 1987 to SLR-38.63 in 1989. The third down 
turn occurred during 1994 to 1995 due to anti-open economy sentiments of the 
new government in 1994. The NOI per capita in 1993 stood at SLR-512.66 but it 
dropped to SLR-45.30 in 1995. Then, the national insecurity in 2001 weakened 
FDI inflow and the per capita NOI dropped from SLR-712.40 in 2000 to SLR-
391.85 in 2001. International insurance companies imposed an insurance 
surcharge for the airplanes and ships that arrive in Sri Lanka after LTTE attack on 
the Sri Lanka’s international airport in year 2000. Further, major air-liners and 
sea-liners refrained from entering the country. In view of these developments, 
foreign investors found Sri Lanka’s investment climate deteriorated and they 
refrained from investing. These incidents not only disturbed FDI inflows but also 
changed the course of the IDP.  
The second question, which requires special examination, is whether Sri 
Lanka has failed in the FDI-reliant development strategy. Views such as “FDI 
concentrates in garment industry has created lopsided development in the 
manufacturing ...” (Atapattu, 1997:84) are prominent critiques. Several other 
ailments diagnosed in Sri Lanka’s FDI-reliant policy include labor intensity of 
production, light manufacturing, insufficient local content, industry concentration, 
absence of technology transfer, and insufficient employment, etc. On the contrary, 
Athukorala (1997) observes that FDI-reliant policy of Sri Lanka has significant 
and favorable effects on employment, information related externality, and trade. 
Rajaratne (2009) found that while Sri Lanka’s NOI position was insignificant but 
the effects of FDI-reliant policy were significant as Sri Lanka’s industry and 
exports were revolutionized through it during the 1980s and 1990s.  
The degree of economic development needs to be connected to the 
endowment of natural and augmentation of created assets. In the context of Sri 
Lanka, there have been predominant weaknesses in the created asset structure and 
as a result, the IDP has slowed down. But, Sri Lanka’s investment-development 
scenario is neither withered nor failed. What can most correctly be said is that Sri 
Lanka’s investment-development relationship is insignificant at the slope of -
0.011 between the two during the past seven decades. The income growth of the 
country thus is less explained by NOI position it being relatively flat. Sri Lanka 
has not lined up in the catching up course along the regional industrial hierarchy 
proposed by Kojima (1973) and Ozawa (1993). Any acceleration to this catching-
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up process requires wide-ranging correction to the created assets structure to 
improve the NOI position of the country.  
The period between 1978 and 2015 comprises the UNP regime from 1978 
to 1994 and SLFP regime from 1995 to 2015. Special attention is given to the 
post war period from 2010 to 2015. The aim of this classification is to pursue a 
closer inquiry into the IDP trends during different policy regimes as well as the 
post war period. The post war period has been especially taken into consideration 
because many analysts and policy specialists maintained the notion that Sri 
Lanka’s FDI position did not improve due to the internal war.   
 
Figure 4: The IDP of Sri Lanka (1978-94) 
 
Source: Appended Table 1 
 
 Figure 4 presents the trend of IDP for the period between 1978 and 1994. 
This period is characterized by open market economy and FDI-reliant export 
oriented industrial policy. The slope of the IDP during the UNP regime (1978-94) 
remained at -0.016 which is the best relationship between FDI and GDP ever 
recorded in Sri Lanka. Although the IDP continued to deepen during 1978 and 
1994 period it began to flatten thereafter during the SLFP regime between 1995 
and 2015 at the slope of -0.010 (Figure 5) witnessing to the FDI hostility policy.  
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Figure 5: The IDP of Sri Lanka (1995-2015) 
 
Source: Appended Table 1 
 
 
It is obvious that during the last six-year period (2010-15), Sri Lanka’s 
annual FDI receipt jumped to near one billion US dollars but it did not progress 
from thereupon and as a result the IDP did not deepen any further. Figure 6 
indicates that during the last six-year period the IDP has flattened at the slope of - 
0.001. This should not be interpreted as the bottoming out of the IDP which 
normally occurs after heavy FDI receipts for a long period of time and high GDP 
in consequence and hence a turnaround in the assets structure and rise of local 
MNCs. The per capita FDI at US$ 38 and per capita income near US$ 4000 at 
present are not much correlated. With low per capita FDI, Sri Lanka remains in 
the early stage-II of the IDP while it corresponds to high per capita income. This 
phenomenon only occurs when the per capita income is generated from other 
sources of revenues rather than FDI-reliant production. 
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Figure 6: The IDP of Sri Lanka (2010-2015) 
 
Source: Appended Table 1 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Sri Lanka’s development policy shifted from IL-ISI to that of an OL-EOI in the 
year 1978. Heavy reliance on FDI (Dunham and Abeysekera, 1987) and 
widespread economic liberalization were major features of this new policy. 
Numerous incentive schemes, including export processing zones and tax 
concessions, were implemented to attract FDI. In this policy, FDI was assigned 
the task of alleviating the resource gap, foreign exchange gap, technology gap and 
employment gap for bringing about economic development. The FDI-reliant 
policy has been in place for nearly four decades and it has been heavily criticized 
that it has failed in satisfactorily achieving those objectives due to failure in 
augmentation of locational advantages sought by foreign multinational 
corporations.     
In order to assess the augmentation of locational advantages in Sri Lanka, 
the IDP model was used and Sri Lanka’s absolute IDP position was derived in 
this study. The absolute IDP of Sri Lanka has been disturbed in four consecutive 
occasions and a shallow IDP has been resulted in. It is also obvious that Sri Lanka 
has just drifted from the Stage-I of the IDP and entered the initial phase of the 
Stage-II. During the early years of the FDI-reliant development strategy, 
industries that seek natural assets have been established. However, the production 
structure has not progressively transformed since then due to failure in the asset 
structure transformation. This reflects the exhaustion of natural assets and poor 
supply of created assets for the industries to enter capital, technology and 
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knowledge intensive production. Theoretically, natural assets help deepen the 
NOI in the initial stage of the IDP while created assets help progress of it in the 
later stages. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s further progress along the IDP will owe to 
dynamic configuration of the created asset base. While the early phase of the 
stage-II of the IDP still requires supply of natural assets the latter phase of it and 
latter stages of IDP indispensably require steady supply of created assets. For 
multinational companies to induce advanced production structure through FDI it 
is imperative for Sri Lanka to redesign its EOI policy in the direction of 
enhancing location specific created asset base targeting production intensiveness 
in capital, technology and knowledge progressively.    
  
Endnotes 
1
 The eclectic paradigm proposed by John Dunning explains the relevance of OLI factors 
in international operations of the firm.  
2
 In the Budget Speech of 1949, J.R. Jayewardene (the Minister of Finance) mentioned “ 
… investment of foreign capital would be particularly welcoming  industrial investments 
because industrial development cannot take place without scientific, technical and 
industrial knowledge, … the government has framed its policy not only to enable further 
foreign capital to be invested in Ceylon, on particular fields of investment in which the 
aid of foreign investment is desirable, and under conditions which safeguard the mutual 
interests of this country and of the foreign investors…”   
3
 In the Budget Speech of 1964-65, N.M. Pereira (the Minister of Finance) mentioned 
“… considering the present critical position of the country’s foreign exchange resources, 
I have decided to declare a moratorium on all remittances, of profits, dividends, interests 
and other investment income for a period of one year in the first instance…” 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Net Outward Investment and GDP Per Capita (1950-2015) 
Year 
GDP per 
capita 
(SLR) 
NOI per 
capita 
(SLR) 
Year 
GDP per 
capita 
(SLR) 
NOI per 
capita 
(SLR) 
1950 510 0.3 1983 7395 -57.3 
1951 542 0.6 1984 8977 -53.2 
1952 520 0.6 1985 9387 -41.9 
1953 542 0.9 1986 10169 -49.1 
1954 566 1.6 1987 10904 -105.2 
1955 578 2.9 1988 12334 -82.9 
1956 565 2.8 1989 13580 -38.6 
1957 588 4.2 1990 17196 -78.2 
1958 615 1.3 1991 19616 -149.1 
1959 618 0.9 1992 22241 -307.3 
1960 646 -0.3 1993 25744 -512.7 
1961 629 0.6 1994 29399 -438.7 
1962 630 0.2 1995 33057 -45.3 
1963 652 -0.5 1996 38029 -259.7 
1964 672 0.1 1997 43918 -415.8 
1965 676 0.0 1998 49882 -483.5 
1966 679 1.2 1999 54357 -680.8 
1967 711 0.4 2000 61155 -712.4 
1968 834 1.0 2001 66610 -391.9 
1969 888 0.9 2002 73857 -911.3 
1970 1055 0.1 2003 81393 -859.6 
1971 1085 -0.1 2004 92822 -1131.8 
1972 1150 -0.1 2005 107057 -1199.7 
1973 1368 -0.2 2006 147776 -2362.7 
1974 1765 -0.1 2007 178845 -3036.9 
1975 1917 0.1 2008 218167 -3701.7 
1976 2046 0.0 2009 236445 -2157.1 
1977 2495 0.6 2010 310214 -4608.7 
1978 2871 -1.7 2011 345925 -4756.6 
1979 3457 -50.8 2012 427559 -5065.4 
1980 4234 -48.2 2013 466112 -5355.4 
17 
 
1981 5361 -65.3 2014 503032 -4107.8 
1982 6270 -87.7 2015 533398 -5223.1 
Source: 
     Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports (various volumes). 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Economic Progress of Independent Sri Lanka (1998). 
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Graph I: The IDP of Sri Lanka since Independence (1950-2015) 
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Graph II: Intensity of NOI-Development during Different Policy Regimes 
 
 
 
Endnotes  
                                                 
1
 The eclectic paradigm proposed by John Dunning explains the relevance of OLI factors 
in international operations of the firm.  
2
 In the Budget Speech of 1949, J.R. Jayewardene (the Minister of Finance) mentioned “ 
… investment of foreign capital would be particularly welcoming  industrial investments 
because industrial development cannot take place without scientific, technical and 
industrial knowledge, … the government has framed its policy not only to enable further 
foreign capital to be invested in Ceylon, on particular fields of investment in which the 
aid of foreign investment is desirable, and under conditions which safeguard the mutual 
interests of this country and of the foreign investors…”   
3
 In the Budget Speech of 1964-65, N.M. Pereira (the Minister of Finance) mentioned “… 
considering the present critical position of the country’s foreign exchange resources, I 
have decided to declare a moratorium on all remittances, of profits, dividends, interests 
and other investment income for a period of one year in the first instance…” 
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